Abstract
On 4 September 2013 the European Commission released a proposal that seeks to restructure the entire European money market fund (MMF) industry. This article outlines the premises of the proposal and discusses concerns related to the most controversial provisions. We believe that economically unfeasible requirements for constant net asset value (CNAV) MMFs will result in the exit of these funds. We believe that the primary objective of fi nancial market stability cannot be achieved by eliminating CNAV MMFs in favour of variable net asset value (VNAV) MMFs. There is simply no evidence that VNAV MMFs are immune to runs. New systemic risk will emerge as a result. Other types of investment products will proliferate, including private liquidity funds, which the existing EU regulation is not addressing. The focus of the proposal is misplaced. Runs in a single fund, whether CNAV or VNAV, due to a credit event should not be the primary regulatory concern. Investing is always a risky business and regulation ought to empower investors with complete information to adequately manage these risks. We recognise that any regulatory rules will be imperfect. The never-ending search for the most effi cient allocation of resources will drive investors away should the post-reform MMF structure prove too costly. The solution can be found in the balance between long-term funding needs of the real economy and the utility of these funds.