Abstract
Antonio Damasio's works have brought emotions into line with current trends in neuroscience. They are conceived as the addition, to a perception, of the somatic effects it has induced. Nevertheless, this continuous and relatively steady process of body perception has also led to the less-known hypothesis of the "neural self." Behind the explicit and apparently contradictory reference to William James and Sigmund Freud, there lies a common source: Theodor Meynert's conception of a "cortical self." Our aim is to enlight a stream unified around what we call here "cerebral self." The Self is thus considered as the cerebral projection or presentation of the body. The specificity of this notion is particularly highlighted by its confrontation to the closely, yet disembodied, notion of "cerebral subject.". Pour citer cette revue : Psychiatr. Sci. Hum. Neurosci. 9 (2011).