Abstract
This study shows that procurements of traditional arms by 2 countries have the possibility of moving together over time. This is demonstrated with reference to Iran and the member states of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) for the period 1961-1996. Acquiring arms by the member states of the GCC is shown to be only a response to the perception of their leaders to the external threat posed by Iran throughout the varying regimes that have ruled Teheran. In the light of the recent emergence of macroeconomic problems such as unemployment in the economies of the GCC coupled with the ineffectiveness of the financially exhausting build-up of arms as a military deterrent policy, one important implication of the study is that the priority of the GCC leaders will have to turn to a more effective deterrent policy such as acquiring nuclear technology rather than engaging in a costly and unsuccessful Arab military alliance as experienced in the 1970s.