Abstract
In this paper, a Cournot game with two competing firms is studied. The two competing firms seek the optimality of their quantities by maximizing two different objective functions. The first firm wants to maximize an average of social welfare and profit, while the second firm wants to maximize their relative profit only. We assume that both firms are rational, adopting a bounded rationality mechanism for updating their production outputs. A two-dimensional discrete time map is introduced to analyze the evolution of the game. The map has four equilibrium points and their stability conditions are investigated. We prove the Nash equilibrium point can be destabilized through flip bifurcation only. The obtained results show that the manifold of the game's map can be analyzed through a one-dimensional map whose analytical form is similar to the well-known logistic map. The critical curves investigations show that the phase plane of game's map is divided into three zones and, therefore, the map is not invertible. Finally, the contact bifurcation phenomena are discussed using simulation.