Abstract
We analyze the rapid growth of Saudi Arabia's domestic oil consumption, a nine-fold increase in 40 years, to nearly 3 million barrels per day, about one-fourth of production. Such rapid growth in consumption – 5.7% annually, which is 37% faster than its income growth of 4.2% – will challenge Saudi Arabia's ability to increase its oil exports, which are relied upon in long-term world oil projections by the International Energy Agency (IEA), US Department of Energy (DOE) and British Petroleum (BP). However, these institutions assume unprecedented slowdowns in Saudi oil consumption – from 5.7% annual growth historically to less than 2% in the future – allowing them to project increases in Saudi oil exports. Using 1971–2010 data, we estimate that the income responsiveness (elasticity) of oil consumption is at least 1.5—using both Ordinary Least Squares regression and Cointegration methods. We believe that continued high growth rates for domestic oil consumption are more likely than the dramatic slowdowns projected by IEA, DOE and BP. This will have major implications for Saudi production and export levels.
► We analyze the rapid growth of Saudi Arabia's domestic oil consumption, now one-fourth of production. ► Estimated income elasticity of oil demand at least 1.5, using OLS and Co-integration. ► Yet IEA, DOE and BP project unprecedented slowdowns, from 5.7% historically to below 2%, half the rate of income growth. ► Continued high growth rates are more likely, with major implications for Saudi production and export levels.