Abstract
In 2009, Obama's administration signaled to hold talks with moderate Taliban leadership but no success was achieved. After each failed talks, the Taliban would intensify insurgency for achieving a greater share in the Afghan affairs as they considered the Afghan government a puppet of America. They wanted to establish their own version of shari'a government but the Afghan government had its own reservations regarding the Taliban and the US-Taliban talks. Such dividends approaches of both the stake holders made all peace overtures irrelevant for a long period of time. Even after the US-Taliban Agreement, the intra-Afghan negotiations could not be held which again caused escalated insurgency. The current research paper is an attempt to answer the question that what were the objectives of US and Taliban behind the peace talks and agreement when peace itself remained a distant reality, and insurgency and violence has escalated instead? It will also analyze the success and failure of those talks and the future prospects for peace.